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We study identi￿cation in a class of three-equation monetary models. We
argue that these models are typically not identi￿ed. For any given exactly
identi￿ed model, we provide an algorithm that generates a class of equivalent
models that have the same reduced form. We use our algorithm to provide
four examples of the consequences of lack of identi￿cation. In our ￿rst two
examples we show that it is not possible to tell whether the policy rule or the
Phillips curve is forward or backward looking. In example 3 we establish an
equivalence between a class of models proposed by Benhabib and Farmer [1]
and the standard new-Keynesian model. This result is disturbing since equi-
libria in the Benhabib-Farmer model are typically indeterminate for a class
of policy rules that generate determinate outcomes in the new-Keynesian
model. In example 4, we show that there is an equivalence between determi-
nate and indeterminate models even if one knows the structural equations
of the model.
JEL-Classi￿cation: C39, C62, D51
Key-words: Identi￿cation, indeterminacy.Non Technical Summary
This paper is about the general lack of identi￿cation in linear rational
expectations models. It has become common practice in applied monetary
economics to estimate single equations using instrumental variables. In a
recent paper, Clarida, Gali and Gertler [4] estimate a monetary policy rule
and they use their estimated rule to argue that monetary policy before 1980
was very diﬀerent from policy after 1980. Their work has been criticized in
a number of recent papers for failing to pay suﬃcient attention to the fact
that identi￿cation is a property of a system. In general one cannot iden-
tify a single equation without making assumptions about the nature of other
equations in the model. We go beyond this literature by drawing attention
to a dimension of the identi￿cation problem that is potentially more serious
if one hopes to use careful econometrics to help to design economic policies
that maximize welfare. We study identi￿cation in a class of three-equation
monetary models and show that, using data from a single policy regime, it is
not possible to tell whether a given period was associated with a policy that
was driven purely by fundamental shocks; or whether sunspots also played
a role. For any given exactly identi￿ed model, we provide an algorithm that
generates a class of equivalent models that have the same reduced form. We
use our algorithm to provide four examples of the consequences of lack of
identi￿cation. In our ￿rst two examples we show that it is not possible to
tell whether the policy rule or the Phillips curve is forward or backward
looking. In example 3 we establish an equivalence between a class of mod-
els proposed by Benhabib and Farmer [1] and the standard new-Keynesian
model. This result is disturbing since equilibria in the Benhabib-Farmer
model are typically indeterminate for a class of policy rules that generate
determinate outcomes in the new-Keynesian model. In example 4, we show
that there is an equivalence between determinate and indeterminate models
1even if one knows the structural equations of the model. In the ￿nal section
of our paper we draw two conclusions from our analysis. Our ￿rst conclusion
is that without observing occasional changes in policy it is not possible to tell
a good policy rule from a bad one. Our second conclusion is that even if an
econometrician observes occasional changes in policy, he still may be unable
to tell if the policies that were followed led to determinate or indeterminate
equilibria.
21 Introduction
It is my view, however, that rational expectations is more deeply
subversive of identi￿cation than has yet been recognized: Christo-
pher A. Sims, "Macroeconomics and Reality", [25], page 7.
This paper is about the general lack of identi￿cation in linear rational
expectations models. It has become common practice in applied monetary
economics to estimate single equations using instrumental variables. In a
recent paper, Clarida, Gali and Gertler [4] estimate a monetary policy rule
and they use their estimated rule to argue that monetary policy before 1980
was very diﬀerent from policy after 1980. Their work has been criticized in
a number of recent papers for failing to pay suﬃcient attention to the fact
that identi￿cation is a property of a system.
In general one cannot identify a single equation without making assump-
tions about the nature of other equations in the model. Examples of recent
papers that make this, or related points, are those of LindØ [16], Lubik and
Schorfheide [18], Nason and Smith [21], Mavroedis [19] and Fuhrer and Rude-
busch [10]. Our paper has considerable overlap with the work of all of these
authors. We go beyond this literature by drawing attention to a dimension
of the identi￿cation problem that is potentially more serious if one hopes to
use careful econometrics to help to design economic policies that maximize
welfare. We show that, using data from a single policy regime, it is not pos-
sible to tell whether a given period was associated with a policy that was
driven purely by fundamental shocks; or whether sunspots also played a role.
We construct an algorithm, implemented in Matlab, that generates equiv-
alence classes of exactly identi￿ed models. Using this algorithm we explore
a series of examples to illustrate the consequences of the lack of identi￿ca-
tion in new-Keynesian models of the monetary transmission mechanism. Our
3paper uses this Matlab algorithm to make four related points.
Our ￿rst point is that a central bank might conceptually respond to cur-
rent past or expected future values of economic variables such as in￿ation
and the output-gap or unemployment. We show that if central bank policy
is modeled with an interest-rate reaction function that allows for all of these
possibilities then the parameters of this reaction function are not identi￿ed.
The econometrician cannot tell from the data whether the central bank re-
sponds to current, past or future in￿ation or whether unemployment, for
example, enters the policy rule separately from in￿ation.
Our second point is that the lack of identi￿cation extends to the struc-
tural equations of the model. The standard new-Keynesian Phillips curve is
purely forward looking but Jeﬀrey Fuhrer [7] has argued that forward looking
behavior is unimportant in empirical models of the price process and Jeﬀrey
Fuhrer and Glen Rudebusch [10] claim that forward looking models of the
new-Keynesian IS curve also ￿nd little support in the data. Following up
on this idea, Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler [11] incorporate a Phillips curve
that has both forward and backward looking elements into a fully speci￿ed
structural model of the economy. We demonstrate in our second example
that the ability to distinguish forward from backward looking equations is a
property of the speci￿cation of the entire model. For example, if the central
bank responds to lagged in￿ation, the parameters of the Phillips curve are
not identi￿ed and the econometrician cannot distinguish a forward looking
Phillips curve of the new-Keynesian variety from a backward looking Phillips
curve of the kind favored by Robert Gordon [12].
Our third example concerns an equivalence between determinate and in-
determinate equilibria.1 Michael Woodford has argued [28] that a policy
1In a previous paper [3], we showed the equivalence between determinate and indeter-
minate equilibria in a class of one equation models. The current paper ￿eshes out this
4maker should strive to design a rule that excludes multiple indeterminate
equilibria. In simple new-Keynesian models this often implies that mone-
tary policy should be active in the sense that a policy maker should raise
the nominal interest rate by more than 1% in response to a 1% increase in
expected in￿ation. Benhabib and Farmer [1] have proposed an alternative
theory of the monetary transmission mechanism in which real balances enter
the production function. In their model the standard wisdom about active
policy is reversed. If monetary policy is active, equilibrium is indeterminate.
In our third example we demonstrate that a new-Keynesian model with a
determinate equilibrium has the same reduced form as a Benhabib-Farmer
economy in which equilibrium is indeterminate. This example is disturbing
since it suggests that an econometrician may be unable to distinguish a good
policy from a bad one.
In a recent working paper [2] we proposed a method of identifying the
structural equations of a rational expectations model: Our method relies on
a natural experiment. Using this approach, a central bank might be able
to identify a set of equations that would enable it to correctly predict the
private sector response to changes in its policy rule. This idea leads us to
our fourth and ￿nal experiment.
In experiment 4, we distinguish the information set of the policy maker
from that of the econometrician. We assume that the econometrician and
the policy maker both know the values of the deep parameters of the private
sector. To acquire this knowledge, perhaps the policy maker conducted an
experiment in which he changed the policy rule at a discrete point in time.
An experiment of this kind would allow both the policy maker and the econo-
example by providing a multi-equation analog in the context of alternative theories of the
monetary transmission mechanism. The idea that determinate and indeterminate models
may be observationally equivalent has been discussed in the case of calibrated examples
by Takashi Kamihigashi [13] and Harold Cole and Lee Ohanian [5].
5metrician to obtain consistent estimates of a subset of the deep structural
parameters of the economy: this was the main point of our earlier paper [2].
The policy maker and the econometrician are distinguished by the assump-
tion that the policy maker knows the rule that was followed before and after
the change in policy but the econometrician does not. We argue that this
is a reasonable assumption because the policy maker knows his own actions
but the econometrician cannot infer these actions by observing the outcome
of the policy-maker￿s experiment.
We use experiment 4 to show that the econometrician cannot distinguish
two diﬀerent rules, one of which was associated with a determinate equilib-
rium and the other with an indeterminate equilibrium. Even if the econome-
trician knows the deep structural parameters he cannot infer from observing
the outcome of a regime change whether the policies before and after the
switch were determinate or indeterminate.
In the ￿nal section of our paper we draw two conclusions from our analy-
sis. Our ￿rst conclusion is that without observing occasional changes in
policy it is not possible to tell a good policy rule from a bad one. Our second
conclusion is that even if an econometrician observes occasional changes in
policy, he still may be unable to tell if the policies that were followed led to
determinate or indeterminate equilibria.
2A C l a s s o f L i n e a r M o d e l s
2.1 The Structural Form
We consider the following class of linear rational expectations models,











In this notation Ψ 1 and 2 are  ￿  matrices of coeﬃcients, 
is an  ￿ 1 matrix of constants,  is a conditional expectations operator
and {} is a weakly stationary i.i.d. stochastic process with covariance
matrix 	 and mean zero.2 Lowercase letters are scalars, and uppercase letters
represent vectors or matrices. We maintain the convention that coeﬃcients
of endogenous variables appear on the left side of each equation with positive
signs and explanatory variables appear on the right side of equations with
positive signs.
2.2 The Companion Form







































￿ 0 = ￿ 1−1 + ￿  + ￿ Ψ + ￿ Ψ
 (4)
2We will focus on the case of one lag, but our method can easily be expanded to include
additional lags or additional leads of expected future variables.
7This is a system of 2￿ equations in 2￿ endogenous variables; these are
the  variables  and the  date 
 expectations of +1, denoted  [+1] The
structural form is a system of  equations in these 2￿ endogenous variables.
To close this model we assume that the subjective probability  [+1] is
taken with respect to the true conditional distribution of the variables +1
This assumption is coded into the second  rows of Equation (3) which de￿nes
the  ￿ 1 vector of non-fundamental errors 
 to be equal to the diﬀerence
between the realization of  and its date 
 − 1 expectation.
2.3 The Reduced Form
The reduced form of an econometric model is a set of equations, one for each
endogenous variable, that explains each endogenous variable as a function of
exogenous and predetermined variables. In models in which expectations do
not appear, one would compute the reduced form by premultiplying Equation
(3) by ￿ 
−1
0 . In rational expectations models this method breaks down for
t w or e a s o n s . F i r s t ,i tm a yb et h ec a s et h a tb o t h ￿ 0 and ￿ 1 are singular;







premultiplies the lagged variables in the reduced form) will not in general all
be inside the unit circle.



















































8In practice the reduced form can be computed in a number of ways.
C h r i s t o p h e rS i m s[ 2 6 ]p r o v i d e sM a t l a bc o d et h a tu s e sa decomposition to
￿nd the solution for a model written in companion form when the solution is
unique.3 The  decomposition uses the generalized eigenvalues of
n
￿ 0 ￿ 1
o
and it does not require either matrix to be non-singular. There are three
possible cases to consider when deriving this solution. Case (1) is that there
exists a unique equilibrium. It is also possible that (2) there is no stationary
equilibrium or (3) there are multiple stationary indeterminate equilibria.
If the model has a unique determinate solution, the non-fundamental er-
rors 
 are endogenously determined as functions of the fundamental errors
 and they do not enter the reduced form, it follows that the matrix Ψ∗
	 is
identically zero. If there are insuﬃcient unstable roots to uniquely determine
the values of the endogenous variables the solution is said to be indetermi-
nate. In this case, the matrices Ψ∗
1	 and Ψ∗
2	 each have column rank equal
t ot h ed e g r e eo fi n d e t e r m i n a c y .
In Section 6, we study a series of examples in which  has dimension
3. For these examples, determinacy means that the companion form of the
system has three unstable eigenvalues. If there are only two unstable eigen-
values there is one degree of freedom in choosing the vector 
 and one can
think of the variables 
 as independent ￿sunspot￿ shocks. Similarly if the
number of unstable eigenvalues is equal to 1 or 0 there are respectively 2 or
3 degrees of indeterminacy. In theses cases there is the potential for 2 or
3 independent sunspot shocks to in￿uence the behavior of the endogenous
variables.
3Thomas Lubik and Frank Schorfheide [17] discuss the case when the solution is inde-
terminate.
93I d e n t i ￿cation
In this section we show how to construct equivalence classes of structural
models that have the same reduced form. We begin with a given structural
model that we parameterize with a vector  and we construct its reduced
form. Given this reduced form, we add a set of linear restrictions {} that
exactly identi￿es some possibly diﬀerent model that we parameterize with a
vector ﬂ . These linear restrictions are encoded into a matrix  and a vector
 with the property ﬂ  = .
















 +  + Ψ (6)









In all of the cases we consider in this paper, the true data generation process
is determinate: This implies that the sunspot variables 
 do not enter the
reduced form. We assume in each example that we study that the covariance
matrix of  is the identity matrix 	
. This assumption is unrestrictive since
any pattern of correlations in the shocks can be encoded into the impact
matrix Ψ. The parameters of the variance-covariance matrix of  and the





and equating coeﬃcients leads to the





















































10Let  be the parameter vector that contains the structural parameters of the
DGP. This consists of the elements of the ￿ve ( ￿ ) matrices 1 2
and Ψ and the ￿1 elements of the vector . After re-arranging Equation








































































































































































































which is a system of (3 +1 )equations in the (5 +1 )parameter vector .
This parameter vector uniquely determines the reduced form 
We refer to the mapping from the structural parameters  to the reduced
form parameters  as  () and we write
 = 
 ()
We ￿x the reduced form matrix  a n dw es e a r c hf o rs o m e( p o s s i b l yd i ﬀerent)
parameter vector ﬂ  that satis￿es the linear equations
ﬂ  =  (9)
11Equation (9) consists of (3 +1 )linear equations in the (5 +1 )￿ 1 para-
meter vector ﬂ .E x a c t i d e n t i ￿cation requires an additional 22 independent
















Our algorithm takes as inputs, ,  and  and it generates a new parameter
vector ﬂ 















that has the same reduced form,  as the DGP: We refer to the map-









We call  ¡ﬂ 
¢
the equivalent model.









































































































































































































































































































As long as  is invertible, the econometrician can recover the equivalent
model ﬂ  from the estimates of the reduced form (contained in )a n dt h e
restrictions, contained in (10).
In section 6 we conduct a set of experiments with our algorithm. In
all of these experiments we assume that the DGP is determinate but in
some of our examples, the equivalent model may have one or more degrees
of indeterminacy. If the equivalent model is indeterminate then sunspot
shocks may in￿uence the solution and the matrix of impact eﬀects for the
non-fundamental shocks, ﬂ Ψ∗
	, may be non-zero.
The reduced form of the equivalent model might, in general, be hit by
both fundamental and sunspot shocks. More generally, the matrix of impact
eﬀects of the shocks that hit the reduced form of the equivalent model might
be diﬀerent from the matrix of impact eﬀects of the shocks that hit the
reduced form of the DGP. In order for the reduced form of the equivalent
model to be identical to the reduced form of the DGP it must, therefore, be
driven by shocks with a diﬀerent variance-covariance matrix from those of
. Our algorithm computes a variance covariance matrix of shocks to the
equivalent model (we call this Ω) that makes the structural form of the DGP
and the structural form of the equivalent model observationally equivalent.
We assume that the equivalent model is driven by a vector of serially













where  is the dimension of indeterminacy of the equivalent model. We



























Our algorithm generates a matrix Ω and a set of impact matrices ﬂ Ψ∗
, ﬂ Ψ∗
	,




















We next discuss the fact that reduced form of the equivalent model, gen-
erated by our algorithm, and the reduced form of the DGP may be diﬀerent
but equivalent representations of the same equations. Let Equation (11)






This representation will not be unique if, as is typically the case, Γ∗ has one
or more zero eigenvalues. Our Matlab code generates one representation of
the reduced form of the DGP and a (possibly diﬀerent) representation of the
reduced form of the equivalent system that we write as follows;
 = ﬂ Γ
∗−1 + ﬂ 
∗ + ﬂ Ψ
∗








where  and  are orthonormal and  is upper-triangular. The matrix Γ∗
has dimension (2 ￿ 2) Suppose that  of its roots are non-zero and 2 −
roots are zero. Our algorithm chooses  such the 2 −  zero roots of Γ∗
appear as diagonal elements on the lower right of the main diagonal. Using
this decomposition we show how to rearrange equations (11) and (12) so that
14the ￿rst  columns of Γ∗ and ﬂ Γ∗ are non-zero and the last 2− columns are










































is the rearranged version of Equation (12).
The rearranged equations may contain moving average errors even if the
shocks to the original system are i.i.d. To accommodate this possibility we
have introduced the notation Ψ∗
Ψ∗
 to refer to the impact matrices of
fundamental shocks to Equation (13), and ﬂ Ψ∗
  ﬂ Ψ∗
	 ﬂ Ψ∗
  ﬂ Ψ∗
	
for the impact matrices of fundamental and sunspot shocks to Equation (14).
In Section 6 of the paper we use a second algorithm to establish that
the equivalent system and the DGP are equivalent representations of the
















































These properties imply that the reduced forms of the two systems are iden-
tical when the DGP is driven by the shocks  with covariance matrix 	
 and
15the equivalent system is driven by the shocks





Table 1 summarizes our notation.



















































































































































































4 A One Equation Example
This section uses the one-equation example from our paper [3] to illustrate






















16where !$1 $"$0 We have parameterized the model in terms of " and !
the roots of the characteristic polynomial of (15) although one could clearly



























































where ' is a non-fundamental error .

























Our ￿rst two examples in Section 6 are elaborations of the idea that
the parameter ! (the unstable root) cannot be recovered from equation (17)
unless the econometrician has prior knowledge of the variance parameter #2
.
" can be estimated from the dynamics of   but ! appears only in the variance
of the residual where it cannot be separated from " and #2
. We will show
that systems of equations can be constructed in which sets of parameters are
not identi￿ed because the econometrician cannot obtain information on the
magnitude of the unstable roots of the system.
The second two examples in Section 6 are based on the fact that one can
￿nd an indeterminate model that has an observationally equivalent reduced
form to that of Equation (15). In the one-equation case, the alternative























































Equations (17) and (19) look diﬀerent because the former system is driven
by a fundamental shock  and the latter by a non-fundamental shock, '.
Furthermore, in Equation (17),   and  [ +1] are functions of  −1 and in
Equation (19) they are functions of −1 [ ]. Our paper [3] showed that
Equation (19) can be arranged to give the following alternative (and com-






















Equation (20) has the same dynamic structure as Equation (17) but it is
driven by a sunspot shock ' as opposed to the fundamental shock .I f
however, # =( !)(" + !))# then the reduced form of the (determinate)
structural model (15) and the reduced form of the (indeterminate) equivalent
model (18) are identical and the two structural models are observationally
equivalent.
E x a m p l e s3a n d4i nS e c t i o n6a r eb a s e do na ne l a b o r a t i o no ft h i se x a m p l e .
A key feature that makes these examples more complicated than Examples 1
and 2 is that the indeterminate system (and or the determinate system) needs
to be rearranged so that the same lagged variables appear as right-hand-side
variables in the reduced form.
185 A Summary of the New-Keynesian Model
In the remainder of this paper we deal explicitly with the following class of
three-equation monetary models. We maintain the convention that endoge-
nous variables (including expectations) appear on the left-hand-side of the
equations and exogenous and predetermined variables appear on the right-
hand-side. We let  = {*+ , } where * is unemployment, + is the
in￿ation rate and , is the nominal interest rate. By convention, * is the
￿rst element of , + is the second element and , i st h et h i r d .W en o r m a l i z e
the ￿rst equation by setting the coeﬃcient on unemployment to unity, the
second equation by setting the coeﬃcient on in￿ation to unity and the third
equation by setting the coeﬃcient on the interest rate to unity. Using this
labeling convention we refer to the ￿rst equation as the unemployment equa-
tion, the second as the in￿ation equation and the third as the interest-rate
equation.4
The New-Keynesian model consists of three equations. The ￿rst is derived









In this expression  is aggregate consumption, , is the nominal interest rate,
/ is the nominal price level, . is the discount factor of the representative
agent,  is the conditional expectations operator and - represents the
marginal utility of consumption. To allow for the fact that the data has a
richer dynamic pattern than that of simple models, some authors also allow
for habit formation in preferences.5 A simple form of habit formation would
4Much of the literature uses the output gap in place of unemployment. Since our own
empirical work has used the unemployment rate, we chose unemployment as the scale
variable in our work on identi￿cation.
5Fuhrer ([8]) is an example.









When equation (22) is linearized around a balanced growth path it leads to
the log-linear equation
%1 + %2−1 = %1 [+1]+%2 + %3 (, − ++1)+1 + 
where lower case  is the log of consumption, ++1 is the log of in￿ation, ,
is the nominal interest rate,  is a preference shock and 1 is a constant.
New Keynesian authors often work with three-equation models in which
consumption is replaced by output and  is interpreted in part as a govern-
ment expenditure shock.6 In our work, we will go one step further than this
and replace  by the negative of unemployment. Implicitly, we are appealing
to Okun￿s law which is a relationship between unemployment and the output
gap. Using these arguments, our ￿rst equation takes the form,
* + %13, + 011 [*+1]+012 [++1]=&11*−1 + 1 + 1 (23)
We use the symbols %, 0 and & to represent arbitrary elements of the ma-
trices ,  and  where , indexes equation and  indexes variable. Hence
%13 is the coeﬃcient on the interest rate in the unemployment equation, &11
and 011 are the coeﬃcients on lagged unemployment and expected future un-
employment and 012 is the coeﬃcient on expected future in￿ation. Since the
coeﬃcients on unemployment are derived from combining the linearized ver-
sion of Equation (22) with Okun￿s law, economic theory imposes the equality
restrictions,
1+011 = &11 (24)
012 + %13 =0  (25)
6Examples include Rotemburg and Woodford [24], or McCallum and Nelson [20] who
refer to an equation with this structure as an optimizing based IS-curve.
20The ￿rst of these restrictions follows from the fact that the linearization
coeﬃcients on  and −1 on the left hand side of equation (22) are the same
as those premultiplying  [+1] and  on the right hand side. The second
restriction follows from the assumption that the real interest rate, not the
nominal interest rate, enters the IS curve.
The second equation of the New-Keynesian model is the Phillips Curve
also known as the New-Keynesian aggregate supply curve, (AS-curve). This
equation takes the form;
+ + %21* + 022 [++1]=2 + 2 (26)
Economic theory predicts that %21 should be positive, re￿ecting the fact that
high unemployment puts downward pressure on in￿ation. The coeﬃcient
022 represents the eﬀect of expected future in￿ation on current price setting
decisions. According to simple versions of the New Keynesian model this
parameter should be equal to the negative of the rate of time preference of
the representative agent. We will set it equal to −097, i.e. 022 = −097 in
our simulations. This is consistent with a steady state real rate of interest of
3%.
To close the New Keynesian model we assume that policy is generated by
a reaction function of the form
, + %31* + %32+ + 031 [*+1]+032 [++1]+033 [,+1]
= &31*−1 + &32+−1 + &33,−1 + 3 + 3 (27)
This is a very general form of the policy rule and in practice we will consider
simpler examples in which the Central Bank responds either to lagged in￿a-
tion or to expected future in￿ation. We will also allow for slow adjustment
of the policy maker to target by including the lagged interest rate in the
policy rule. One example of a simple rule that has been widely studied in
21t h el i t e r a t u r ei sg i v e nb yt h ee q u a t i o n :
, + 032 [++1]=&33,−1 + 3 + 3 (28)
In the following section we will use this three-equation example to il-
lustrate a number of points connected with identi￿cation in linear rational
expectations models. We have chosen this particular model for ease of expo-
sition and it should be apparent that the same points that we make will apply
to models in which unemployment is replaced by the output-gap, or when
the system is expanded to include a wage sector and a measure of marginal
cost as in the work of Gali and Gertler [11] or Argia Sbordone [27].
6 Experiments with the New Keynesian Model
In this section we use our Matlab code to illustrate four points connected
with identi￿cation in rational expectations models. We begin by conducting
an experiment in which we point out that the policy rule of a monetary model
is not generally identi￿ed when one recognizes that there is no compelling
reason to exclude backward, current or forward looking variables.
Our second experiment goes on to show that lack of identi￿cation extends
to the other equations of a New-Keynesian model. Speci￿cally, we show that
it is not possible to identify the Phillips curve without an arbitrary decision
about which variables enter the IS curve and the policy rule. This second
experiment throws doubt on the arguments of LindØ [15] and Rudd and
Whelan [23] who argue that backward looking Phillips curve perform better
than forward looking Phillips curves at explaining data. Our experiment
suggests that their results hinge on arbitrary exclusion restrictions made
somewhere in the system of equations in order to achieve identi￿cation of
the Phillips curve.
22In experiments 3 and 4 we move from systems in which equilibria are
determinate to systems in which one or more identi￿cation schemes are as-
sociated with indeterminate equilibria. These experiments yield results that
are successively more damaging to a research program that hopes to uncover
a unique representation of the data from a careful combination of microfoun-
dations and econometrics.
6.1 Experiment 1: Policy Rules are Not Identi￿ed
We begin with the issue of identi￿cation of the policy rule. A number of
authors, (an example is the work of Clarida, Gali and Gertler [4]), have used
instrumental variables to estimate policy rules in new Keynesian models.
Our ￿rst experiment begins with a model of the form
* =  [*+1]+0 05(, −  [++1]) − 00015 + 1 (29)
+ =0 97 [++1] − 05* +0 0256 + 2 (30)
, =1 1 [++1]+0 028 + 3 (31)
The variable * is the logarithm of unemployment, + is the in￿ation rate
and , is the nominal interest rate. Equation (29) is an optimizing IS curve,
Equation (30) is a New-Keynesian aggregate supply curve and (31) is a policy
rule. The constants are chosen such that the model has a steady state
unemployment rate of 5%, a real interest rate of 3% and a steady state
























































in which there are no intrinsic dynamics. It is well known that this model
has a unique determinate equilibrium as long as the government follows a
23policy in which the coeﬃcient of in￿ation in the policy rule is greater than
1; following the work of Eric Leeper[14], a policy with this property is called
active. But all policies of the form
, = −032 [++1]+3 + 3
for which
|032| $ 1
lead to exactly the same reduced form as Equation (32), as long as 3 and 032
are chosen to preserve the same steady state interest rate. More generally,
any policy the class
, = −%31* − %32+ − 031 [*+1] − 032 [++1]+3 (33)
























































provided the policy preserves the same degree of determinacy as rule (31).
6.2 Experiment 2: We Can￿t Tell if the Phillips Curve
is Backward or Forward Looking
There is a debate in the literature over the exact form of the aggregate
supply curve. In simple New Keynesian theories the aggregate supply curve
is represented by a forward looking Phillips curve, but Jeﬀrey Fuhrer [7]
has argued that the data is better ￿t by a model with a backward looking
in￿ation term. The following example illustrates that this point may not be
decidable purely from the data since the supply curve may not be identi￿ed.
24Consider the model
* =  [*+1]+0 05(, −  [++1]) − 00015 + 1 (34)
+ =0 97 [++1] − 05* +0 0256 + 2 (35)
, =1 1+−1 +0 028 + 3 (36)
in which the supply curve is forward looking but the central bank responds
to lagged in￿ation. Our second experiment uses Equations (34)￿(36) as the
DGP and correctly identi￿es the IS curve and the policy rule. However, the
econometrician incorrectly identi￿es a hybrid aggregate supply curve of the
form
+ = −022 [++1]+&22+−1 − %21* + 2 + 2 (37)
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25Our algorithm reveals a large class of hybrid models, all of which have the
same reduced form as the DGP. The following table presents ￿ve examples
of models in this class.
Coeﬃcient 022 &22 %21 2
−097 0 −050 0256
−097 025 −51671 02540
−097 05 −98342 04823
−097 075 −145013 07107
−097 10 −191683 09390
Table 2
In experiment 2, the econometrician correctly identi￿es the coeﬃcient on
expected future in￿ation, equal to 097, but he incorrectly estimates a non-
zero parameter on lagged in￿ation. Table 2 shows how the constant and
the coeﬃcient on unemployment are adjusted to compensate for diﬀerent
alternative values of the parameter &22,( t h ec o e ﬃcient on lagged in￿ation).
All of the models recorded in Table 2 deliver the same reduced form model
as the DGP.
6.3 Experiment 3: We Can￿t Distinguish Alternative
Theories of Aggregate Supply
A number of authors have taken up the issue of optimal policy in the new-
Keynesian model. Michael Woodford [28] has argued that the central bank
should strive to implement a policy that leads to a unique determinate ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium since, if policy admits the possibility of indeter-
minacy, non-fundamental shocks may contribute to the variance of in￿ation
and unemployment. This consideration suggests that a policy maker that
dislikes variance should pick a policy rule that leads to a determinate equi-
26librium.
In the class of new-Keynesian models represented by equations (29), (30)
and (31), equilibrium is determinate if 032 ( −1 and indeterminate if 0 $
032 $ −1. In the former case, the central bank increases the nominal interest
rate by more than one-for-one if it expects additional future in￿ation; a policy
with this property is said to be active. In the latter case the central bank
increases the interest rate by less than one-for-one if it expects additional
in￿ation and in this case the policy is said to be passive.
Benhabib and Farmer [1] have argued that prices are slow to adjust, not
because of barriers or frictions that prevent agents from adjusting prices, but
because equilibria are typically indeterminate. The Benhabib-Farmer model
has the same IS curve as the new-Keynesian model, but a diﬀerent supply
curve that takes the form
* + %23, = &21*−1 + 2 + 2 (38)
In this model, the parameter %23 is negative. The mechanism by which the
nominal interest rate in￿uences aggregate supply operates through liquidity
eﬀects in production; a lower nominal interest rate causes agents to hold
more real balances and this increases economic activity. The parameter &21
allows the eﬀects of high interest rate policies to be distributed through
time. In a simple form of the Benhabib-Farmer model, with the additional
simpli￿cations of no habit formation, no lagged adjustment of the policy
rule,no lagged adjustment of the supply curve and a policy rule of the form
, = −%32+ + 3 + 3 (39)
equilibrium is determinate if 0 $% 32 $ −1 and indeterminate if %32 ( −1
This is exactly the opposite situation of the new-Keynesian model. In the
Benhabib-Farmer model, active policy implies indeterminacy and passive
policy implies determinacy.
27In our third experiment we chose the DGP to consist of the following
three equations
* =0 5 [*+1]+0 5*−1 +0 05(, −  [++1]) − 00015 + 1 (40)
+ =0 97 [++1] − 05* +0 0256 + 2 (41)
, =1 1 [++1] − 0012 + 08,−1 + 3 (42)
The IS curve contains lagged unemployment, re￿ecting habit formation in
preferences, and the policy rule is forward looking with a lagged interest
coeﬃcient re￿ecting a theory of partial adjustment of the central bank to-
wards its target. The AS curve is a standard forward looking new-Keynesian
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28We assume that the econometrician correctly identi￿es the IS curve but he as-
sumes incorrectly that aggregate supply is generated by the Benhabib Farmer
model. Further, the econometrician incorrectly assumes that policy responds
to current in￿ation, rather than to expected future in￿ation. The econome-
trician estimates the correct IS curve, but a supply curve and a policy rule
of the form
* =0 2038, +0 859*−1 − 00031 + 2 (44)
, =0 626+ +0 7129,−1 +0 0018 + 3 (45)
The reduced form of the Benhabib-Farmer equivalent model is given by the
equation
 = ﬂ 
∗ + ﬂ Γ
∗−1 + ﬂ Ψ
∗













































08491 0 010320 001160 00906 00567
−00778 0 −03301 00906 07101 04446
−00487 0 05062 00567 04446 02783
06332 0 013220 001480 01161 00727
−06984 0 −02344 −00263 −02059 −01289




























16982 −00906 01289 01075
−01556 02899 −04126 08427
−00974 −04446 06328 05275
12665 −01161 01653 01378
−13969 02059 −02930 −02443





















03 0260 0 07625
00 0 0








































This example is unlike those from experiments 1 and 2 because the equiv-
alent system is indeterminate. In experiment 3 our Matlab algorithm pro-
duces two equivalent reduced forms that use diﬀerent right-hand-side vari-
ables. This equivalence is possible because, as in the one-equation example
that we described in Section 4, the matrices Γ∗ and ﬂ Γ∗ have one or more zero
roots.
To check the equivalence of the two representations, we wrote a second
algorithm that rewrites a ￿rst order  ￿ 1 matrix diﬀerence equation with
 non-zero roots so that the ￿rst  variables of the system all appear as
lagged variables on the right-hand-side. When we ran the reduced forms
from experiment 3 through this algorithm we were able to represent the






















































































Models (48) and (49) are observationally equivalent even though model
(48) describes a determinate new-Keynesian DGP and model (49) is an
indeterminate Benhabib-Farmer model in which the covariance matrix in-
cludes a sunspot. The variance covariance matrix of the driving process
to the new-Keynesian model is diagonal and consists of three fundamental
shocks of equal variance. The variance covariance matrix of the shocks to
the Benhabib-Farmer model, given by Equation (47), has rank 3.O n l yt w o
of the three fundamental shocks have non-zero variances. The third funda-
mental shock is replaced by a sunspot variable 
 that is correlated with the
fundamentals.
6.4 Experiment 4: The Importance of Transparency
Experiments 1 through 3 highlight a point we made in our earlier paper [2];
it is diﬃcult or impossible to credibly identify the monetary transmission
process using data from a single sample in which all the parameters of the
model remain invariant. The message we take away from these examples is
that natural experiments of the kind we exploit in our paper [2] are essential
if an econometrician is to be able to identify the structure of the economy.
If the experiments do not occur ￿naturally￿ as a consequence of changes in
political regimes then, in theory, it would make sense for a benevolent policy
maker to engage in deliberate experimentation to learn about the nature of
the private sector.
31Our fourth and ￿nal experiment is designed to illustrate that experimen-
tation on its own is not enough to tell whether a given policy rule led to a
determinate or an indeterminate outcome; in that theoretical environment
the policy maker must also be transparent in the following sense. We dis-
tinguish between the policy maker who conducts an experiment by changing
the policy rule, and the econometrician who observes the outcome of the ex-
p e r i m e n t .W ea s s u m et h a tf o ra￿xed period of time the policy maker follows
policy rule A and that at a given date, announced in advance, he switches
to policy rule B. The policy maker and the econometrician both observe the
outcome of this experiment and, using the methods discussed in [2], they are
each able to identify a subset of the equations that describe the structure of
the private sector. Typically, however, the policy maker and the econome-
trician will have diﬀerent information sets since the policy maker knows the
rules that were followed during the two periods of the policy experiment but
the econometrician may not.
In Experiment 4 we assume that the DGP is given by the same process
as in Experiment 3, that is;
* =0 5 [*+1]+0 5*−1 +0 05(, −  [++1]) − 00015 + 1 (50)
+ =0 97 [++1] − 05* +0 0256 + 2 (51)
, =1 1 [++1] − 0012 + 08,−1 + 3 (52)
We assume further that the econometrician knows that Equations (50) and
(51) are the true equations that characterize the private sector of the econ-
omy.7 However, the econometrician does not know the policy rule that was
followed by the central bank and he assumes, incorrectly, that the lagged
7By observing a natural experiment, the econometrician can learn a subset of the
private sector structural equations; in Beyer Farmer [2] we call this subset the recoverable
structure. In contrast, we assume in this section that the econometrician knows the
structural form; this is more information than he could hope to learn through experiment.
32interest rate does not enter this equation. The econometrician estimates
instead, a policy rule of the form;
, = −46383* − 35295+ +0 3525 + 3 (53)










and the equivalent model in which the econometrician misidenti￿es the policy











































































and the equivalent model is driven by two fundamental shocks and one
sunspot, just as with Example 3. This Experiment is discouraging for the
ability of careful econometrics to distinguish good and bad policies since it
suggests that even if the econometrician knows the true structure of the pri-
vate sector, he cannot tell whether the policy maker followed a rule that led
to a determinate or an indeterminate equilibrium.8
However, since the recoverable form and the structural equations are equivalent ways of
modeling the private sector response to any given policy rule, it makes no diﬀerence to
our argument if we give the econometrician this additional knowledge about the private
sector.
8This is in contrast to Lubik and Schorfheide [17], who claim to be able to distinguish
determinate from indeterminate equilibria. Their procedure relies on a priori restrictions
to the lag length of both the structure and the policy rule. The fact that restrictions of
this kind are important was ￿rst pointed out by Pesaran [22].
337 Conclusions
What did we learn from this paper? Let￿s imagine a discussion where a policy
maker turns to a new-Keynesian economist. The new-Keynesian economist
gives the following advice.
￿Mr. Chairman, I have estimated the response of the economy to changes
in the interest rate and I counsel that policy should be active. You would be
wise to increase the fed funds rate by more than one-for-one in response to an
increase in expected in￿ation since a rule of this kind will minimize the danger
of irrational exuberance as a separate impulse to economic ￿uctuations.￿
Experiment 3 suggests that this advice is overcon￿dent at best. A pol-
icy advisor who had read the Benhabib-Farmer [1] paper might oﬀer these
alternative words of wisdom.
￿Mr. Chairman, my esteemed colleague is clearly mistaken since he
is working with a wrong and outdated theory of aggregate supply. I have
checked his conclusions and I ￿nd that the policy rule he suggests will have
exactly the opposite eﬀects from those that he predicts. You would be wise
to move cautiously by increasing the fed funds rate less than one for one in
response to an increase in expected in￿ation.￿
How could the policy maker decide which of these two economists is cor-
rect? If the economy were a laboratory and the policy maker were a scientist,
one could imagine the following experiment. The open market committee
could ￿x on a rule for a given period of, say, ￿ve years. We imagine that
the parameters of this rule would be known and announced in advance. At
the end of this ￿ve year period the open market committee would change
its policy to a diﬀerent preannounced rule and this second rule would be fol-
lowed for an equal period of time. An experiment of this kind would allow an
impartial econometrician to use the break in policy to identify the structural
equations of the private sector by following the approach discussed in [2].
34Transparency is crucial for this policy to work. Rules must be announced to
the public, but also, the econometrician must be kept aware of their details.
It is only with this information in hand that the econometrician can com-
pletely identify the structural parameters of the economy and thereby give
advice as to the welfare properties of alternative rules.
The economy, however, is not a laboratory. One would hope that design-
ing monetary policy in the spirit of the controlled experiment discussed in
this paper would contribute to social welfare - but it would induce also costs.
In order to balance the costs and bene￿ts one would need to ￿nd a measure
for an optimal degree of "experimentation". This might be an interesting
avenue for future research.
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